The Iran War - Costs of conflict

The ongoing US-Iran conflict has had lasting global consequences. The US has publicly claimed that the cost of the war for the nation was $29 billion, however the actual cost for the country is estimated to be closer to $200 billion. The difference comes in the form of higher global oil prices resulting in consumers paying more at the pump and increased defence spending in order to replenish severely depleted weapon stockpiles. The impact on countries across the globe is perhaps even greater than on the US due to the heavy reliance on oil & gas and products such as fertilizers that rely on petro-chemical derivatives, the supply of which has been severely impacted by the war.

Therefore, the question remains, what did the US actually achieve from the conflict? The US claimed that its reason for entering the conflict was to neutralise the Iranian nuclear weapon programs as a form of deterrence to protect Israel and the rest of the world from the apparent “existential threat”. Note, that the initial objectives included regime change but that was quickly removed from focus, when it became apparent that it was not something that the US could control (unlike what they were able to achieve in Venezuela). Additionally, the Iranian control over the Straits of Hormuz is now a confirmed fact having previously being a possibility, but not something the Iranian side have ever tested. The issue with the US claim is the fact that, through the 14-point Memorandum of Understanding (MoU), the US has only broadly restricted Iran’s development of a nuclear arsenal. Critics therefore argue that the Iran war has achieved very little, and has only focussed global attention further to the lack of adherence to International law and the woes that come with it. It has also raised concerns around the US war powers, and the consequences of unilateral declaration of war globally.

International Law

According to Brian Finucane, a senior adviser with the U.S. Program at the International Crisis Group, Article 51 of the UN charter requires that the use of force in the form of self defence, which was how the US classified its strikes against Iran, necessitates that there is an “armed attack” before force can be used. In the case of the Iran war this was never the case, with the US using the strikes as a preemptive defence measure. This is illegal under international law. In fact, in 1981, the US itself was part of a resolution condemning Israel for

the preventative use of force against Iraq. They stated that “The presence in a State of the military capacity to injure or even to destroy another State cannot itself be considered a sufficient basis for the defensive use of force.” This is ironic, as it is the exact situation that the US find themselves in Iran.

In the case of the Iran war, the claim that the strikes were simply in order to mitigate the nuclear threat in Iran fails under Article 51 of the UN charter. However, while it was clear that the strikes were a preemptive defence measure, many argue that some form of control needed to be reinstated over the Iranian nuclear development which was approaching near weapon grade. Trump and his regime attempted to justify the use of force as a response to an imminent threat posed by Iran. This would make the strikes legal, but according to the Arms Control Association, there is no evidence whatsoever to support these claims. The CIA Director John Ratcliffe said Trump ultimately decided on the urgency of a threat which means that the imminent threat claim is likely a superficial justification to attempt to dodge Article 51.

Furthermore, the war itself has shown that the Trump administration prefers bilateral deals to multilateral international agreements. The strategic exit of the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA) in 2018 by Trump kickstarted the increased enrichment of uranium in Iran past the 3.67% limit set, in violation of the original deal. Furthermore, they imposed sweeping sanctions that isolated Iran from the global economy. Now, after attempting to prevent the very enrichment and expansion that they caused by withdrawing from the agreement, the US has produced the 14 point MoU in attempts to reinstate control over the Iranian nuclear expansion. Effectively attempting to achieve the same thing as the initial JCPOA, the MoU highlights the Trump administration desire to negotiate unilaterally rather than working with the UN or even allies. The attack and subsequent deal are indicative of a lack of deference to international bodies and the desire to resolve issues militarily rather than diplomatically.

MoU vs JCPOA

The JCPOA was an agreement negotiated between the US during the Obama

administration with Iran alongside several international actors (including all permanent UN Security Council members as well as Germany), which limited Iran’s nuclear enrichment and development. While the MoU was never intended to be the final deal with the text specifically highlighting a 60-day window for negotiation for a final deal, there are some areas where it can be compared with the JCPOA from 2015. Trump promised that the deal would be significantly better than its counterpart from the Obama administration, but has he actually achieved that?

One of the key comparison points between the JCPOA and the MoU is the text surrounding nuclear enrichment and weapon development. The JCPOA mandated strict limits on uranium enrichment set at 3.67% for 15 years which could be used for a nuclear power program. Contrastingly, the memorandum is vague with it failing to mention if Iran will be able to enrich uranium at all. This is a problem because senior Iran analyst at Crisis Group Naysan Rafati says that the US will likely look for zero enrichment which contrasts strongly with the Iranian desire to have some recognition of its capacity to enrich as a sovereign nation. This was given in the JCPOA with the 3.67% limit. Additionally, while the MoU may be successful in preventing Iran nuclear weapon development, it doesn’t actually change much with Shahram Akbarzadeh, director of the Middle East Studies Forum at Deakin University stating that “Iran has consistently reiterated that it does not pursue the atomic bomb”.  

The position of both deals on sanctions relief is another potential point of comparison. The MoU in point 6 writes that the US and it’s gulf allies will provide Iran with $300 billion in investment for the “reconstruction and economic development” of Iran. The Trump administration has criticized the JCPOA deal for handing over cash to the Iranians, an unsubstantiated claim. The JCPOA gave Iran no access to funding for economic development (it merely unfroze USD 1.6bn in debt that was owed by the US to Iran, while maintaining other economic sanctions in place). Further, in point 7, the deal highlights that the US will terminate all forms of sanctions against Iran, in stark contrast to the JCPOA which allowed for a gradual curb on sanctions which was conditional on Iranian participation in the deal. Ironically, Trump actually cited the access to restricted funds for Iran as a major concern and reason for his eventual exit from the agreement. 

Moreover, the issue of monitoring and verification is another aspect of comparison between the MoU and JCPOA. The MoU refers to the monitoring of the successful implementation of the terms of the memorandum and subsequent negotiated agreement in point 12 where it writes that an “executive mechanism will be established” for the purpose of monitoring the implementation. This is contrasted by the JCPOA which established a comprehensive verification framework in the form of unfettered IAEA access to track uranium mines and Iran’s nuclear supply chain. The lack of an international verification system makes it harder to confirm Iranian compliance with the system. Additionally, a US led system would likely garner opposition from the Iranian government who would prefer international monitoring rather than having to defer to the US. Again, any new deal reached with Iran appears to be worse than what the existing JCPOA had put in place and had been tested for a number of years.

While there are some points of comparison between the deal and the international agreement, it would be unfair to compare the two in detail as the MoU is a deal struck with the main focus being to terminate conflict rather than to deal with the nuclear threat in full. A true comparison will only be possible once the MoU is followed up by a full agreement, the merits of which can then be compared against the JCPOA. As it currently stands there is little to suggest that any subsequent agreement will in fact be better than the JCPOA, making it appear that the decision to renege on that agreement was more political than rational.

Consequences for the US

The Iran war has also brought to light several issues around the war powers divide in the US. The War Powers Resolution (WPR) passed by Congress in 1973, gives the President the ability to deploy military forces without Congressional approval. The tool has been heavily criticised for the way that it has transferred the onus of the deployment of military forces from the legislative branch to the executive. Many argue that the resolution gives the President war powers that the designers of the constitution never intended. The ability to unilaterally initiate a war has been seen as unconstitutional and has historically led to conflicts that were ultimately avoidable. This is furthered by the Brennan Center for Justice which says that ultimately the power to declare a war was given to Congress to make it specifically harder to enter conflict, which this resolution directly contradicts. 

In the case of the US military operation in Iran, the President used the WPR to bypass Congress to utilise military force. Under the resolution, 60 days after the initial use of force, the action is automatically terminated unless Congress authorises the action. However, the

Trump administration has controversially attempted to take a different reading of the text, with defence secretary Pete Hegseth claiming that the ceasefires during the conflict pause the clock, a fact which Congress disagrees with. 

However, the conflict in Iran has only brought to light a deeper issue with the divide. Problems  with the controversial piece of legislation have existed for years, with operations around the globe including in Libya, Kosovo and Venezuela. The issue regarding the divide in the constitutionally assigned power to Congress and the executive has existed for decades, and was simply brought to the forefront by the operation in Iran.

Overall, the conflict between the US and Iran has had several impacts on the United States and the rest of the world. It has caused onlookers to question the importance and global deference to international law, especially in an age when a few individual countries hold large amounts of power. Furthermore, the conflict has led to the adoption of the MoU - the deal that appears to highlight the US position on Iran’s nuclear program. The deal seems to act as a replacement for the JCPOA from 2015 and upon comparison, appears to have less utility and is definitely not a multi-lateral agreement. Finally, the conflict also demonstrates the deep divide between the executive branch and Congress, especially on issues regarding war powers. In my opinion, the war actually achieved very little for the world. 

Diplomacy and discussion are always better than conflict in my eyes, because the lives that are lost are irreplaceable in the latter. Respect for International Law, due process, the checks and balances provided by domestic an international institutions are probably facts we have come to associate with the developed world and “Western” democracies. However, the US-Iran conflict appears to have brought these factors to the fore and perhaps permanently impacted the global trust that the US had garnered over almost a century of being an international superpower.